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OPINION OF THE COURT 
____________ 
 
SLOVITER, Circuit Judge. 
 
In this appeal, we consider the antitrust implications of 
an agreement by a manufacturer of a generic drug that, in 
return for a payment by the patent holder, agrees to drop its 
challenge to the patent and refrain from entering the market 
for a specified period of time. 
 
A secondary issue concerns the certification by the 
District Court of a class of antitrust plaintiffs.  Specifically, 
we must determine whether the antitrust injury allegedly 
suffered by class members can be shown through common 
proof, i.e. proof applicable to all plaintiffs, and whether there 
are insurmountable conflicts preventing named plaintiffs from 
adequately representing the members of the class.   
 
These appeals arise out of the settlement of two patent 
cases involving the drug K-Dur 20 (“K-Dur”), which is 
manufactured by Schering-Plough Corporation (“Schering”). 
Plaintiffs are Louisiana Wholesale Drug Company, Inc., on 
behalf of a class of wholesalers and retailers who purchased 
K-Dur directly from Schering and nine individual plaintiffs, 
including CVS Pharmacy, Inc., Rite Aid Corporation, and 
other pharmacies.  Defendants are Schering and Upsher-
Smith Laboratories (“Upsher Smith”).1
                                              
1 In appeals numbered 10-2077, 10-2078, and 10-2079, 
Appellants challenge the District Court’s grant of summary 
judgment on behalf of defendants, relying on their patents.  In 
No. 10-4571, defendants challenge the District Court’s 
certification of a class of plaintiffs. 
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I. STATUTORY AND REGULATORY 
FRAMEWORK  
 
K-Dur is Schering’s brand-name sustained-release 
potassium chloride supplement.2
 
  Sustained-release potassium 
chloride is used to treat potassium deficiencies, including 
those that arise as a side effect of the use of diuretic products 
to treat high blood pressure.   
 Schering did not hold a patent for the potassium 
chloride salt itself, as that compound is commonly known and 
not patentable.  Instead, Schering held a formulation patent on 
the controlled release coating it applied to the potassium 
chloride crystals.  Schering identified patent number 
4,863,743 (“the ‘743 patent”) as the patent that would be 
infringed by the production of a generic version of K-Dur.  
Schering assigned the ‘743 patent to its subsidiary Key 
Pharmaceuticals, Inc.  The ‘743 patent was set to expire on 
September 5, 2006.   
 
 By statute, a pharmaceutical company must obtain 
from the Food and Drug Administration (“FDA”) approval 
before it may market a prescription drug.  21 U.S.C. § 355(a).  
For a new drug, the approval process requires submission of a 
New Drug Application (“NDA”), which includes exhaustive 
information about the drug, including safety and efficacy 
studies, the method of producing the drug, and any patents 
issued on the drug’s composition or methods of use.  Id. § 
355(b)(1).  The FDA publishes the patent information 
submitted in NDAs in the “Approved Drug Products with 
Therapeutic Equivalence Evaluations,” otherwise known as 
the “Orange Book.”  See FDA Electronic Orange Book, 
http://www.fda.gov/cder/ob/. 
 
In 1984, attempting to jumpstart generic competition 
with name brand pharmaceuticals, Congress passed the Drug 
                                              
2 After the facts at issue in this case, Merck & Co. 
acquired Schering, the named defendant in these actions.  
However, in keeping with the practice of the parties and 
amici, the court will refer to Schering.   
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Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act, 
commonly known as the Hatch-Waxman Act.  Pub. L. No. 
98-417, 98 Stat. 1585 (1984).  The Hatch-Waxman Act 
amended the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, 21 
U.S.C. §§ 301-399, to permit a potential manufacturer of a 
generic version of a patented drug to file an abbreviated 
application for approval with the FDA.  See 21 U.S.C. § 
355(j).  This short form application, known as an Abbreviated 
New Drug Application (“ANDA”), may rely on the FDA’s 
prior determinations of safety and efficacy made in 
considering the application of the patented drug.  Id. § 
355(j)(2)(A). 
 
When a generic manufacturer files an ANDA, it is also 
required to file a certification that, “in the opinion of the 
applicant and to the best of his knowledge,” the proposed 
generic drug does not infringe any patent listed with the FDA 
as covering the patented drug.  Id. § 355(j)(2)(A)(vii).  The 
generic manufacturer can satisfy this requirement by 
certifying one of the following four options with respect to 
the patent for the listed drug:  “(I) that such patent 
information has not been filed, (II) that such patent has 
expired, (III) [by certifying] the date on which such patent 
will expire, or (IV) that such patent is invalid or will not be 
infringed by the manufacture, use, or sale of the new drug for 
which the application is submitted.”  Id. § 355(j)(2)(A)(vii).  
The generic manufacturers at issue here, Upsher and ESI, 
used the fourth of these certification options, the so-called 
“paragraph IV certification.”  Id. § 355(j)(2)(A)(vii)(IV).  
When a would-be generic manufacturer submits a paragraph 
IV certification, it must consult the Orange Book and provide 
written notice to each listed patent owner impacted by the 
ANDA.  Id. § 355(j)(2)(B)(iii)(I).  By statute, a paragraph IV 
certification constitutes a technical act of patent infringement.  
35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(2)(A). 
 
Upon receiving notice of a paragraph IV certification 
with respect to one of its pharmaceutical patents, the patent 
holder may initiate an infringement suit based on the filing of 
the paragraph IV certification alone within forty-five days 
after the generic applicant files its ANDA and paragraph IV 
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certification.  21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(B)(iii).  Filing suit by the 
patent holder within that window effects an automatic stay 
that prevents the FDA from approving the generic drug until 
the earlier of (1) thirty months have run or (2) the court 
hearing the patent challenge finds that the patent is either 
invalid or not infringed.  Id. § 355(j)(5)(B)(iii)(I).   
 
Congress explained that the purpose of the Hatch-
Waxman Act is “to make available more low cost generic 
drugs.”  H.R. Rep. No. 98-857(I), at 14-15, reprinted in 1984 
U.S.C.C.A.N. 2647, 2647-48.  In order to encourage generic 
entry and challenges to drug patents, the Hatch-Waxman Act 
rewards the first generic manufacturer who submits an 
ANDA and a paragraph IV certification by providing it with a 
180-day period during which the FDA will not approve 
subsequent ANDA applications.  21 U.S.C. § 
355(j)(5)(B)(iv).  The 180-day exclusivity period is triggered 
on the date on which the first ANDA applicant begins 
commercial marketing of its drug.  Id.  Notably, the 180-day 
exclusivity window is only available to the first filer of an 
ANDA with a paragraph IV certification, meaning that even 
if the first filer never becomes eligible to use its 180-day 
exclusivity period because it settles, loses, or withdraws the 
litigation, that potential benefit will not pass to subsequent 
filers.  21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(D)(iii).  It has been suggested 
that the first filer is usually the most motivated challenger to 
the patent holder’s claimed intellectual property.  See C. Scott 
Hemphill, Paying for Delay: Pharmaceutical Patent 
Settlement as a Regulatory Design Problem, 81 N.Y.U. L. 
Rev. 1553, 1583 (2006) (noting “a sharp difference in 
incentives . . . between [the first paragraph IV] filer and all 
other generic firms”). 
 
As explained further below, in the years after the 
passage of Hatch-Waxman, some of the patent infringement 
suits occurring under the Hatch-Waxman framework were 
resolved through settlement agreements in which the patent 
holder paid the would-be generic manufacturer to drop its 
patent challenge and refrain from producing a generic drug 
for a specified period.  These agreements are known as 
“reverse payment agreements” or “exclusion agreements.”  
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Concerned about the possible anticompetitive effects of 
reverse payment agreements, see S. Rep. No. 107-167, at 4 
(2002), Congress amended Hatch-Waxman as part of the 
Medicare Prescription Drug, Improvement, and 
Modernization Act of 2003.  Those amendments require 
branded and generic pharmaceutical companies who enter 
into patent litigation settlements to file those settlement 
agreements with the Federal Trade Commission (“FTC”) and 
the Department of Justice (“DOJ”) for antitrust review.  Pub. 
L. No. 108-173, §§ 1111-1118, 117 Stat. 2066, 2461-64 
(codified as amended at 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)).   
 
II. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL 
BACKGROUND 
 
A.  Approval of the ‘743 Patent 
 
The patented invention claims a controlled-release 
dispersible potassium chloride tablet.  The ‘743 patent was 
developed using a technique called “microencapsulation,” a 
process in which small particles of a drug are coated to make 
them disperse over time.  The research supporting the ‘743 
patent built on work that Schering had done for an earlier 
patent for a controlled-release aspirin tablet, Patent No. 
4,555,399 (“the ‘399 patent”).  The application for what 
became the ‘743 patent was initially rejected by the Patent 
and Trademark Office (“PTO”) as obvious in light of the ‘399 
patent and other prior art.  In order to circumvent the prior art, 
Schering amended its application for what became the ‘743 
patent to clarify that the controlled release coating in the 
invention contained ethylcellulose with a viscosity of greater 
than 40 cp,3
 
 whereas the ‘399 patent called for the use of 
ethylcellulose with a viscosity of 9-11 cp.  Schering argued 
that a coating containing ethylcellulose of greater than 40 cp 
was not obvious under the prior art.  After this amendment, 
the PTO granted the ‘743 patent on September 5, 1989.  
                                              
3 Centipoise, abbreviated “cp”, is a measure of viscosity.  
McGraw-Hill Dictionary of Scientific and Technical Terms 
354 (6th ed. 2003). 
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B.  The Schering-Upsher Litigation and 
Settlement 
 
In August 1995, Upsher filed the first ANDA seeking 
approval to produce a generic version of K-Dur to be called 
Klor-Con M20.  Upsher provided a paragraph IV certification 
to Schering in November 1995, certifying that its generic 
would not infringe Schering’s ‘743 patent.  On December 15, 
1995, within the forty-five-day window provided by Hatch-
Waxman, Schering sued Upsher in the District of New Jersey 
for patent infringement, triggering the 30-month automatic 
stay in FDA approval of Upsher’s generic.   
 
Upsher’s defense against Schering’s patent 
infringement suit was based on differences between the 
chemical composition of the controlled release coating in its 
generic product and that of the invention claimed in the ‘743 
patent.  Throughout the litigation, Upsher vigorously 
defended against Schering’s infringement claims, at one point 
telling the court that Schering’s claims of infringement “are 
baseless and could not have been made in good faith.”  App. 
at 3610.   
 
The parties began trying to settle the infringement case 
at least as early as May 1997.  During settlement negotiations, 
Upsher requested both a cash payment and an early entry date 
for its generic product.  However, Schering expressed 
concern about possible antitrust problems that might arise if it 
made a reverse payment.   
 
In the early morning of June 18, 1997, just hours before 
the District Court was to rule on the pending cross motions for 
summary judgment and begin, if necessary, a patent trial, 
Upsher and Schering agreed to settle the case.  The settlement 
was memorialized in an eleven-page short-form agreement dated 
June 17, 1997 (“the Schering-Upsher agreement”).  That 
agreement provided that, while Upsher did not concede the 
validity, infringement, or enforceability of the ‘743 patent, it 
would refrain from marketing its generic potassium chloride 
supplement or any similar product until September 1, 2001, at 
which point it would receive a non-royalty non-exclusive license 
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under the ‘743 patent to make and sell a generic form of Klor-
Con.  Additionally, Upsher granted Schering licenses to make 
and sell several pharmaceutical products Upsher had developed, 
including Niacor-SR, a sustained-release niacin product used to 
treat high cholesterol.  In return, Schering promised to pay 
Upsher sixty million dollars ($60,000,000) over three years, plus 
additional smaller sums depending upon its sales of Niacor-SR 
in defined markets.  While the parties to this litigation dispute 
whether the payment was solely for the licensing of Upsher 
products or instead formed part of the consideration for 
dropping the patent action, the agreement lists Upsher’s 
promises to dismiss the patent infringement action and not to 
market any sustained-release microencapsulated potassium 
chloride tablet until September 1, 2001, as part of the 
consideration for the payment.  
 
The settlement agreement and the acquisition of 
licenses from Upsher were ratified by Schering’s board of 
directors on June 24, 1997.  Subsequent to the settlement, 
Upsher and Schering abandoned plans to make and market 
Niacor-SR.   
 
In this action, the parties dispute the facts related to the 
Niacor-SR license.  Plaintiffs contend that the license was a 
sham and that the $60 million paid as royalties for Niacor-SR 
was actually compensation for Upsher’s agreement to delay 
the entry of its generic extended-release potassium tablet.  On 
the other hand, defendants contend that Schering’s board 
valued the license deal separately and that $60 million was its 
good faith valuation of the licenses at the time.   
 
C.  The Schering-ESI Litigation and 
Settlement 
 
 In December 1995, ESI Lederle4
                                              
4 ESI is the generic division of American Home Products, 
Inc., which changed its name to Wyeth in 2002.  Melody 
Peterson, American Home Is Changing Name to Wyeth, New 
York Times, Mar. 11, 2002.  Wyeth was subsequently 
  (“ESI”) filed an 
ANDA seeking FDA approval to make and sell a generic 
13 
 
version of K-Dur along with a paragraph IV certification 
stating that its proposed generic did not infringe the ‘743 
patent.  Within the forty-five-day period provided by the 
Hatch-Waxman Act, Schering sued ESI for patent 
infringement in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania.  ESI 
defended on the ground that, unlike K-Dur, its generic 
equivalent did not employ a “coating material with two 
different ingredients” as specified by the ‘743 patent, but 
rather was made by a “different technology which produces a 
multi-layered coating with each layer comprised of a separate 
material having only a single ingredient.”  App. at 1696-97. 
 
 In the fall of 1996, Schering and ESI agreed to 
participate in court-supervised mediation before a magistrate 
judge.  The settlement agreement the parties eventually 
reached (“the Schering-ESI agreement”) called for Schering 
to grant ESI a royalty-free license under the ‘743 patent 
beginning on January 1, 2004.  In exchange, Schering would 
pay ESI $5 million up front and a varying sum depending on 
when ESI’s ANDA was approved by the FDA.  Specifically, 
Schering agreed to pay ESI an amount ranging from a 
maximum of $10 million if ESI’s ANDA was approved 
before July 1999 down to a minimum of $625,000 if the 
ANDA was not approved until 2002.  As part of the 
settlement, ESI also represented that it was not developing 
and had no plans to develop any other potassium chloride 
product. 
 
 The FDA approved ESI’s generic K-Dur product in 
May 1999, and Schering paid ESI the additional $10 million 
as required under the settlement agreement.   
 
D. The FTC Action 
 
                                                                                                     
acquired by Pfizer, Inc. in 2009.  Pfizer, “Wyeth 
Transaction,” http://www.pfizer.com/investors/ 
shareholder_services/wyeth_transaction.jsp (last visited May 
8, 2012).  Plaintiffs settled their claims against ESI’s 
corporate parent Wyeth in January 2005.   
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 In March 2001, the FTC filed a complaint against 
Schering, Upsher, and ESI alleging that Schering’s 
settlements with Upsher and ESI unreasonably restrained 
commerce in violation of Section 5 of the Federal Trade 
Commission Act, 15 U.S.C. § 45.  Specifically, the FTC 
alleged that the settlement payments from Schering to Upsher 
and ESI constituted reverse payments intended to delay 
generic entry and improperly preserve Schering’s monopoly.   
 
 In June 2002, after a lengthy trial, the Administrative 
Law Judge (“ALJ”) issued an initial decision dismissing the 
FTC’s complaint and finding that neither agreement violated 
Section 5 of the FTC Act.  In re Schering-Plough Corp., 
Initial Decision, 136 F.T.C. 1092, 1263 (2002).  The ALJ 
found that there was no reverse payment in the Schering-
Upsher agreement because the licensing deal included in that 
agreement was separately valued and was not a payment to 
Upsher to delay generic entry.  Id. at 1243.  The ALJ also 
found that the Schering-ESI agreement was not an attempt to 
unlawfully preserve Schering’s monopoly power in the 
market.  Id. at 1236, 1262-63. 
 
 In December 2003, the FTC unanimously reversed the 
ALJ’s ruling, finding that there was a “direct nexus between 
Schering’s payment and Upsher’s agreement to delay its 
competitive entry” and that this agreement “unreasonably 
restrain[ed] commerce.”  In re Schering-Plough Corp., Final 
Order, 136 F.T.C. 956, 1052 (2003).  The FTC likewise found 
that the ESI settlement violated antitrust law, noting that 
Schering had not attempted to rebut the natural presumption 
that the payment to ESI was for delay in generic entry, except 
to argue unpersuasively that the parties felt judicial pressure 
to settle.  Id. at 1056-57.  In making these determinations, the 
FTC found that it was “neither necessary nor helpful to delve 
into the merits of the [underlying patent disputes].”  Id. at 
1055.  Rather, the FTC determined that, where a name brand 
pharmaceutical maker pays a generic manufacturer as part of 
a settlement, “[a]bsent proof of other offsetting consideration, 
it is logical to conclude that the quid pro quo for the payment 
was an agreement by the generic to defer entry beyond the 
date that represents an otherwise reasonable litigation 
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compromise.”  Id. at 988.  In applying the rule of reason, the 
FTC concluded that the possible existence of a reverse 
payment raises a red flag and can give rise to a prima facie 
case that an agreement is anticompetitive.  Id. at 991, 1000-
01.  The FTC concluded that the reverse payment at issue was 
illegal because the settling parties could show neither (1) that 
the payment was for something other than delay of generic 
entry nor (2) that the payment had pro-competitive effects.  
Id. at 988-89, 1061. 
 
Schering appealed the FTC’s ruling to the Eleventh 
Circuit, which reversed in Schering-Plough Corp. v. FTC, 
402 F.3d 1056 (11th Cir. 2005).  The Eleventh Circuit’s 
ruling in Schering-Plough is discussed in Section III(C) infra. 
 
E. The Instant Litigation 
 
Separate from the FTC’s challenge, various private 
parties filed antitrust suits attacking the settlements.  Those 
suits, the matters giving rise to this appeal, were 
consolidated in the District of New Jersey by the Judicial 
Panel on Multidistrict Litigation.  In 2006, by consent of the 
parties, the District Court appointed Stephen Orlofsky as 
Special Master with responsibility to handle all motions, 
including motions for class certification and summary 
judgment.5
 
   
                                              
5 Because there was no objection to the appointment of a 
Special Master, we have no occasion to address the use of 
Special Master to prepare Reports and Recommendations on 
summary judgment motions.  See In re Bituminous Coal 
Operators’ Ass’n, Inc., 949 F.2d 1165, 1168 (D.C. Cir. 1991) 
(“Rule 53 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure authorizes 
the appointment of special masters to assist, not to replace, 
the adjudicator, whether judge or jury, constitutionally 
indicated for federal court litigation.”) (emphasis in original) 
(citing La Buy v. Howes Leather Co., Inc., 352 U.S. 249, 256 
(1957)). 
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On April 14, 2008, the Special Master certified a class 
of plaintiffs consisting of forty-four wholesalers and retailers 
who purchased K-Dur directly from Schering.  The District 
Court adopted that decision on December 30, 2008.6
 
   
In February 2009, the Special Master issued a Report 
and Recommendation granting defendants’ motions for 
summary judgment and denying plaintiffs’ motions for partial 
summary judgment.  In his Report and Recommendation, the 
Special Master applied a presumption that Schering’s ‘743 
patent was valid and that it gave Schering the right to exclude 
infringing products until the end of its term, including 
through reverse payment settlements.  Under this analysis, the 
settlements in this case would only be subject to antitrust 
scrutiny if (1) they exceeded the scope of the ‘743 patent or 
(2) the underlying patent infringement suits were objectively 
baseless.  The Special Master determined that neither of these 
exceptions applied.  The District Court subsequently adopted 
the Report and Recommendation in its entirety.   
 
F.  Economic Background and the History  
of Reverse Payment Settlements  
 
 Reverse payment settlements appear to be unique to 
the Hatch-Waxman context, and the FTC has made them a 
top enforcement priority in recent years.  A 2010 analysis by 
the FTC found that reverse payment settlements cost 
consumers $3.5 billion annually.  FTC, Pay-for-Delay: How 
Drug Company Pay-Offs Cost Consumers Billions 2 (2010), 
available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/2010/01/100112 
payfordelayrpt.pdf.  The FTC estimates that about one year 
after market entry an average generic pharmaceutical product 
takes over ninety percent of the patent holder’s unit sales and 
sells for fifteen percent of the price of the name brand 
product.  Id. at 8.  This price differential means that 
consumers, rather than generic producers, are typically the 
biggest beneficiaries of generic entry.   
 
                                              
6 The class certification decision is discussed in Section 
IV infra. 
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III.      THE ANTITRUST ISSUE (Appeals Nos.  
                       10-2077, 10-2078, 10-2079) 
 
A. Jurisdiction and Standard of Review 
 
The District Court had jurisdiction pursuant to 15 
U.S.C. § 15(a) and 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1337.  This court 
has jurisdiction over the antitrust appeals pursuant to 28 
U.S.C. § 1291. 
 
This court exercises plenary review of the District 
Court’s grant of summary judgment, applying the same 
summary judgment standard that guides the District Court.  
Eichenlaub v. Twp. of Indiana, 385 F.3d 274, 279 (3d Cir. 
2004). 
 
B. General Antitrust Standard 
 
The Sherman Act provides, in part, that “[e]very 
contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or 
conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among the 
several States, or with foreign nations, is declared to be 
illegal.”  15 U.S.C. § 1.  Under a literal reading, this provision 
would make illegal every agreement in restraint of trade.  See 
Arizona v. Maricopa Cnty. Med. Soc’y, 457 U.S. 332, 342 
(1982).  However, it has not been so interpreted.  Rather the 
Supreme Court has long construed it to prohibit only 
unreasonable restraints.  See State Oil Co. v. Khan, 522 U.S. 
3, 10 (1997).  Whether a restraint qualifies as unreasonable 
and therefore conflicts with the statute is normally evaluated 
under the “rule of reason.”  Id.  Applying this approach, “the 
finder of fact must decide whether the questioned practice 
imposes an unreasonable restraint on competition, taking into 
account a variety of factors, including specific information 
about the relevant business, its condition before and after the 
restraint was imposed, and the restraint’s history, nature, and 
effect.”  Id.  This inquiry has been divided into three parts.  
First, the plaintiff must show that the challenged conduct has 
produced anti-competitive effects within the market.  United 
States v. Brown Univ., 5 F.3d 658, 668 (3d Cir. 1993). If the 
plaintiff meets the initial burden, “the burden shifts to the 
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defendant to show that the challenged conduct promotes a 
sufficiently pro-competitive objective.”  Id. at 669.  Finally, 
the plaintiff can rebut the defendant’s purported pro-
competitive justification by showing that the restraint is not 
reasonably necessary to achieve the pro-competitive 
objective.  Id.   
 
Courts have recognized, however, that “[s]ome types 
of restraints . . . have such predictable and pernicious 
anticompetitive effect, and such limited potential for  
pro-competitive benefit, that they [should be] deemed 
unlawful per se.”  State Oil Co., 522 U.S. at 10.  Examples of 
agreements that have been held unlawful pursuant to the per 
se rule include horizontal price fixing, output limitations, 
market allocation, and group boycotts.  See Copperweld 
Corp. v. Independence Tube Corp., 467 U.S. 752, 768 (1984); 
N. Pac. Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 5 (1958).  The per se 
rule is applied where a “practice facially appears to be one 
that would always or almost always tend to restrict 
competition or decrease output.”  Broad. Music, Inc. v. CBS, 
Inc., 441 U.S. 1, 19-20 (1979).   
 
In some situations, courts apply an antitrust analysis 
that falls between the full rule of reason inquiry on the one 
hand and the rigid per se approach on the other.  This so-
called “quick look” or “truncated rule of reason” analysis 
applies where the plaintiff has shown that the defendant has 
engaged in practices similar to those subject to per se 
treatment.  See Brown Univ., 5 F.3d at 669.  Having so 
shown, plaintiff is not required to make a full showing of 
anti-competitive effects within the market; rather defendant 
has the burden of demonstrating pro-competitive 
justifications.  Id. 
 
C. Precedent from Other Circuits 
 
Neither this court nor the Supreme Court has yet 
weighed in on the legality of reverse payment settlements.  
However, five other circuits have addressed the question.  
Two of those courts – the first two to consider the question – 
concluded that such agreements should be subject to strict 
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antitrust scrutiny, at least where the settling parties attempted 
to manipulate the 180-day exclusivity period to block all 
potential generic competition.  The three courts to address the 
question of reverse payments more recently have reached a 
contrary result, ruling that such agreements are permissible so 
long as they do not exceed the potential exclusionary scope of 
the patent. 
   
1. 
 
D.C. Circuit – Andrx Pharms., Inc. v. 
Biovail Corp. Int’l, 256 F.3d 799 
(D.C. Cir. 2001) 
The D.C. Circuit considered a reverse payment in 
Andrx Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Biovail Corp. International, 
256 F.3d 799 (D.C. Cir. 2001), cert. denied, 535 U.S. 931 
(2002).  Unlike the instant case, that case did not involve a 
settlement resolving patent litigation.  Rather, while allowing 
the patent litigation to continue, the name brand manufacturer 
agreed to compensate the would-be generic producer to delay 
marketing a generic product. 
 
In September 1995, Andrx Pharmaceuticals (“Andrx”) 
filed an ANDA seeking to manufacture and sell a generic 
form of Cardizem CD, a heart drug for which Hoechst Marion 
Russell, Inc. (“HMRI”) held the patent.  Id. at 803.  Andrx 
filed a paragraph IV certification and was timely sued for 
patent infringement by HMRI.  Id.  The filing of the patent 
infringement suit triggered the thirty-month waiting period 
during which the FDA could not give final approval to Andrx 
or any subsequent ANDA applicants seeking to make a 
generic version of Cardizem CD.  Id. (citing 21 U.S.C. 
§ 355(j)(5)(B)(iii)).  In June 1997, a second generic 
manufacturer, Biovail Corp. International (“Biovail”), filed an 
ANDA and a paragraph IV certification to produce generic 
Cardizem CD.  Shortly thereafter, the FDA issued a tentative 
approval of Andrx’s ANDA.  Id.   
 
Soon after the tentative approval was issued, HMRI 
and Andrx entered into an agreement pursuant to which 
HMRI would pay Andrx $40 million per year beginning on 
the date that Andrx received final approval from the FDA and 
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ending on the date that Andrx either began selling generic 
Cardizem CD or was adjudged liable for patent infringement 
in the pending suit.  Id.  The apparent purpose of this 
agreement was to create a bottleneck by delaying the 
triggering of Andrx’s 180-day period of exclusivity, and 
thereby delaying generic entry not only by Andrx but also by 
any other potential generic manufacturer.  Id. at 804. 
 
The D.C. Circuit reversed the district court’s dismissal 
with prejudice of Biovail’s antitrust claims, holding that the 
agreement between HMRI and Andrx could “reasonably be 
viewed as an attempt to allocate market share and preserve 
monopolistic conditions.”   Id. at 811.  The D.C. Circuit 
treated the payment from HMRI to Andrx as prima facie 
evidence of an illegal agreement not to compete, noting that 
“Andrx’s argument that any rational actor would wait for 
resolution of the patent infringement suit [before triggering 
the 180-day exclusivity period] is belied by the quid of 
HRMI’s quo.”  Id. at 813. 
   
2. 
 
Sixth Circuit – In re Cardizem CD 
Antitrust Litig., 332 F.3d 896 (6th 
Cir. 2003) 
The Sixth Circuit’s decision of In re Cardizem CD 
Antitrust Litigation concerned the same agreement considered 
by the D.C. Circuit in Andrx.  332 F.3d 896 (6th Cir. 2003), 
cert. denied, 543 U.S. 939 (2004).  The Sixth Circuit case was 
brought by direct and indirect purchasers of Cardizem CD 
who alleged that they suffered antitrust harm as a result of 
Andrx’s agreement with HRMI to delay market entry.  Id. at 
903-04.  The Sixth Circuit held that the Andrx-HRMI 
agreement was “a horizontal agreement to eliminate 
competition in the market for Cardizem CD throughout the 
entire United States, a classic example of a per se illegal 
restraint of trade.”  Id. at 908.   
 
While both Cardizem and Andrx concerned an 
agreement that caused a bottleneck by preventing other 
generic manufactures from entering the market by delaying 
the triggering of the first filer’s 180-day exclusivity period, 
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much of the Sixth Circuit’s reasoning in Cardizem is equally 
applicable to cases, like the instant one, that do not involve 
bottlenecking.  Specifically, the Sixth Circuit emphasized its 
concern that, even setting aside the bar to subsequent generic 
applicants, HMRI had paid Andrx not to enter the market 
itself, stating, “it is one thing to take advantage of a monopoly 
that naturally arises from a patent, but another thing 
altogether to bolster the patent’s effectiveness in inhibiting 
competitors by paying the only potential competitor $40 
million per year to stay out of the market.”  Id. at 908. 
 
3. 
 
Eleventh Circuit – Valley Drug Co. v. 
Geneva Pharms., Inc., 344 F.3d 1294 
(11th Cir. 2003) and Schering-Plough 
Corp. v. FTC, 402 F.3d 1056 (11th 
Cir. 2005) 
The Eleventh Circuit has also considered the question 
of reverse payments settlements in three significant cases.  
The first of these, Valley Drug Co. v. Geneva 
Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 344 F.3d 1294 (11th Cir. 2003), cert. 
denied, 543 U.S. 939 (2004), concerned two agreements 
arising out of cases where a name brand drug manufacturer 
sued generic manufacturers for patent infringement and the 
generic manufacturers defended on the ground of patent 
invalidity.7
                                              
7 One of these agreements was a final settlement of certain 
claims, the other was structured, like the agreements in Andrx 
and Cardizem, to take effect even as the litigation continued.  
See Valley Drug, 344 F.3d at 1300. 
  Id. at 1299-301.  In the two agreements at issue, 
the name brand manufacturer agreed to pay the generic 
manufacturer substantial sums to refrain from entering the 
market until the end of the name brand manufacturer’s patent 
term.  Id. at 1300. The patent at issue was subsequently 
declared invalid in another case.  Id. at 1306-07.  The district 
court granted summary judgment to antitrust plaintiffs, 
holding that the settlements were per se violations of the 
Sherman Act.  Id. at 1301.  The Eleventh Circuit reversed on 
the ground that the name brand manufacturer held a patent 
that gave it the right to exclude competitors.  Id. at 1306.  In 
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so ruling, the court emphasized the fact that the name brand 
manufacturer might have prevailed in the underlying patent 
litigation, id. at 1309, and highlighted policy considerations 
favoring the settlement of patent litigation, id. at 1308 n.20.  
The court applied neither a per se nor rule of reason analysis 
to the agreements as a whole; rather, it directed the district 
court to first determine whether any part of the agreement 
went beyond the protections afforded by the name brand 
manufacturer’s patent and, if so, to apply traditional antitrust 
scrutiny only to those portions of the agreement.  Id. at 1311-
1312.   
 
A subsequent Eleventh Circuit case, Schering-Plough 
Corp. v. FTC, arose out of the same settlement agreement as 
the instant appeal.8
                                              
8 Defendants argue in passing that this court should begin 
its analysis in this case with a strong presumption in favor of 
following the Eleventh Circuit’s decision in Schering-Plough.  
However, none of the cases cited by defendants employs such 
a presumption; rather, they stand for the unsurprising 
proposition that this court will follow the decisions of its 
sister courts where it finds them persuasive.  See, e.g., 
Ramadan v. Chase Manhattan Corp., 229 F.3d 194, 197-203 
(3d Cir. 2000) (following the rulings of other courts of appeal 
on similar facts but conducting an independent analysis).  As 
explained below, we do not find the Eleventh Circuit’s 
decision in Schering-Plough persuasive, and thus decline to 
follow it. 
  402 F.3d 1056 (11th Cir. 2005), cert. 
denied, 548 U.S. 919 (2006).  After the FTC found that both 
agreements violated antitrust laws, the defendants appealed to 
the Eleventh Circuit.  Applying the test articulated in Valley 
Drug, the Eleventh Circuit set aside the ruling of the FTC.  Id. 
at 1065-66, 1076.  The court rejected the FTC’s conclusion 
that Schering’s $60 million payment to Upsher was for 
something other than the licenses it obtained, finding by 
“overwhelming evidence” that the payment was only for the 
licenses.  Id. 1069-71.  As such, the court found that there 
was no reverse payment from Schering to Upsher and thus 
necessarily no antitrust violation in that agreement.  Id.  With 
respect to the ESI settlement, the court acknowledged the 
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presence of a reverse payment but concluded that the payment 
was acceptable in light of judicial policy favoring settlements 
and the court’s finding that the settlement terms “‘reflect[ed] 
a reasonable implementation’ of the protections afforded by 
patent law.”  Id. at 1072 (quoting Valley Drug, 344 F.3d at 
1312).9
  
  
Plaintiffs construe Valley Drug and Schering-Plough 
as requiring courts to conduct an ex post evaluation of the 
strength of the underlying patent before determining whether 
the patent shields an agreement from antitrust scrutiny.  
However, following oral argument in this case, the Eleventh 
Circuit explicitly rejected that interpretation of its prior 
holdings.   In FTC v. Watson Pharmaceuticals, Inc., the 
Eleventh Circuit clarified that its prior opinions did not call 
for an evaluation of the strength of the patent but rather only a 
determination whether, absent sham litigation or fraud in 
obtaining the patent, the settlement agreement exceeded the 
scope of the patent.  FTC v. Watson Pharms, Inc., No. 10-
12729, 2012 WL 1427789, at *11 n.8, *12 (11th Cir. Apr. 25, 
2012).  Thus the standard applied by the Eleventh Circuit is 
identical to the scope of the patent test applied by the Second 
Circuit to which we now turn. 
   
4. 
 
Second Circuit – In re Tamoxifen 
Citrate Antitrust Litig., 466 F.3d 187 
(2d Cir. 2006) 
The Second Circuit’s decision of In re Tamoxifen 
Citrate Antitrust Litigation arose out of an agreement settling 
a patent infringement suit over the drug tamoxifen, then the 
most widely prescribed drug for the treatment of breast 
cancer.  466 F.3d 187, 190 (2d Cir. 2006), cert. denied, 551 
U.S. 1144 (2007).  That settlement was reached while the 
patent case was on appeal after the district court had ruled the 
                                              
9 The Eleventh Circuit subsequently applied, without 
further significant explication, the scope of the patent test 
announced in Valley Drug and Schering-Plough in another 
case, Andrx Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Elan Corporation, PLC, 
421 F.3d 1227 (11th Cir. 2005). 
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patent invalid.  Id.  The settlement called for the name brand 
manufacturer to grant the generic manufacturer a license to 
sell an unbranded version of tamoxifen and make a reverse 
payment of $21 million to the generic manufacturer.  The 
settlement was contingent on obtaining a vacatur of the 
district court’s judgment holding the patent to be invalid, 
which was subsequently obtained.  Id.   
 
Affirming the district court’s dismissal of antitrust 
plaintiffs’ claims, the Second Circuit applied a presumption 
of patent validity and held that “there is no injury to the 
market cognizable under existing antitrust law, as long as 
competition is restrained only within the scope of the patent.”  
Id. at 213 (internal citations and quotation marks omitted).  
The only exceptions to this rule, the court held, occur where 
there is evidence that the patent was procured by fraud or that 
the enforcement suit was objectively baseless.  Id.  This test is 
commonly referred to as the “scope of the patent test” or the 
“Tamoxifen test.”  The Second Circuit conceded that there 
was a potentially troubling result of such a rule in that “[t]he 
less sound the patent or the less clear the infringement, and 
therefore the less justified the monopoly enjoyed by the 
patent holder, the more a rule permitting settlement is likely 
to benefit the patent holder by allowing it to retain the 
patent.”  Id. at 211.  The court determined, however, that this 
risk was counterbalanced by the judicial preference for 
settlement.  Id.   
 
In reaching this conclusion, the Second Circuit 
concluded that “the Hatch-Waxman Act created an 
environment that encourages [reverse payments]” because, 
unlike traditional infringement suits where the patent holder 
can negotiate by agreeing to forego the infringement damages 
it expects to recover, there usually are no infringement 
damages in Hatch-Waxman suits.  Id. at 206.  The Second 
Circuit thus reasoned that the “reverse payments” common in 
Hatch-Waxman suits are less troubling because they take the 
place of infringement damages that the patent holder might 
have otherwise waived in order to reach a settlement.  Id. 
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Judge Pooler dissented from the decision in 
Tamoxifen, contending that the scope of the patent rule 
applied by the majority “is not soundly grounded in Supreme 
Court precedent and is insufficiently protective of the 
consumer interests safeguarded by the Hatch-Waxman Act 
and the antitrust laws.”  Id. at 224 (Pooler, J., dissenting).  
Judge Pooler argued, inter alia, that judicial reevaluation of 
patent validity is a public good that reverse payment 
settlements undercut, id. at 225-26, and suggested that the 
proper antitrust standard is one of reasonableness considering 
all the circumstances affecting a restrictive agreement 
including (1) the strength of the patent as it appeared at the 
time of settlement, (2) the amount of the reverse payment, (3) 
the amount the generic manufacturer would have made during 
its 180-day exclusivity period, and (4) any ancillary anti-
competitive effects of the agreement.  Id. at 228. 
 
In a subsequent reverse payment case, Arkansas 
Carpenters Health & Welfare Fund v. Bayer AG, the Second 
Circuit applied the Tamoxifen standard and rejected an 
antitrust challenge to a Hatch-Waxman settlement involving a 
reverse payment.  604 F.3d 98 (2d Cir. 2010), cert. denied, 
131 S. Ct. 1606 (2011).  However, the judges on the Arkansas 
Carpenters panel made clear that they thought that Tamoxifen 
was wrongly decided and invited appellants to petition for 
rehearing en banc.  Id. at 108-10.  Among other things, the 
Arkansas Carpenters court noted its concern about evidence 
suggesting that the number of reverse payment settlements 
had increased dramatically in the wake of the Tamoxifen 
decision.  Id. at 109.  Rehearing en banc was subsequently 
denied over a dissent from Judge Pooler.  Ark. Carpenters 
Health & Welfare Fund v. Bayer AG, 625 F.3d 779 (2d Cir. 
2010). 
 
5. 
 
Federal Circuit – In re Ciprofloxacin 
Hydrochloride Antitrust Litig., 544 
F.3d 1323 (Fed. Cir. 2008) 
In In re Ciprofloxacin Hydrochloride Antitrust 
Litigation the Federal Circuit considered a case related to 
those confronted by the Second Circuit in Arkansas 
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Carpenters.  544 F.3d 1323 (Fed. Cir. 2008), cert. denied, 
129 S. Ct. 2828 (2009).10
   
  The Federal Circuit applied the 
scope of the patent test explicated in Tamoxifen and other 
cases, stating, “[t]he essence of the inquiry is whether the 
agreements restrict competition beyond the exclusionary zone 
of the patent.”  Id. at 1336.  The court further “agree[d] with 
the Second and Eleventh Circuits . . . that, in the absence of 
evidence of fraud before the PTO or sham litigation, the court 
need not consider the validity of the patent in the antitrust 
analysis of a settlement agreement involving a reverse 
payment.”  Id. 
D. Analysis 
 
While the first two courts of appeal to address the 
issue of reverse payments subjected those agreements to 
antitrust scrutiny, later courts have gravitated toward the 
scope of the patent test under which reverse payments are 
permitted so long as (1) the exclusion does not exceed the 
patent’s scope, (2) the patent holder’s claim of infringement 
was not objectively baseless, and (3) the patent was not 
procured by fraud on the PTO.  The scope of the patent test 
was applied by the Special Master in this case and has been 
applied by at least one other district court in this circuit.  See 
King Drug Co. of Florence, Inc. v. Cephalon, Inc., 702 F. 
Supp. 2d 514, 528-29, 533 (E.D. Pa. 2010) (applying scope of 
the patent test but denying defendants’ motion to dismiss 
where plaintiffs pleaded facts supporting their claim that the 
underlying patent suit was objectively baseless).  As a 
practical matter, the scope of the patent test does not subject 
reverse payment agreements to any antitrust scrutiny.  As the 
antitrust defendants concede, no court applying the scope of 
the patent test has ever permitted a reverse payment antitrust 
case to go to trial.   
 
                                              
10 That case was severed by the Second Circuit and 
transferred to the Federal Circuit because it involved a claim 
arising out of patent law.  See Order, No. 05-2863 (2d Cir. 
Nov. 7, 2007). 
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After consideration of the arguments of counsel, the 
conflicting decisions in the other circuits, the Report of the 
Special Master, and our own reading, we cannot agree with 
those courts that apply the scope of the patent test.  In our 
view, that test improperly restricts the application of antitrust 
law and is contrary to the policies underlying the Hatch-
Waxman Act and a long line of Supreme Court precedent on 
patent litigation and competition. 
 
First, we take issue with the scope of the patent test’s 
almost unrebuttable presumption of patent validity.  This 
presumption assumes away the question being litigated in the 
underlying patent suit, enforcing a presumption that the patent 
holder would have prevailed.  We can identify no significant 
support for such a policy.  While persons challenging the 
validity of a patent in litigation bear the burden of defeating a 
presumption of validity, this presumption is intended merely 
as a procedural device and is not a substantive right of the 
patent holder.  See Stratoflex, Inc. v. Aeroquip Corp., 713 
F.2d 1530, 1534 (Fed. Cir. 1983) (“The presumption, like all 
legal presumptions, is a procedural device, not substantive 
law.”).  Moreover, the effectively conclusive presumption 
that a patent holder is entitled to exclude competitors is 
particularly misguided with respect to agreements – like those 
here – where the underlying suit concerned patent 
infringement rather than patent validity: In infringement cases 
it is the patent holder who bears the burden of showing 
infringement.  See Egyptian Goddess, Inc. v. Swisa, Inc., 543 
F.3d 665, 679 (Fed. Cir. 2008).   
 
Rather than adopt an unrebuttable presumption of 
patent validity, we believe courts must be mindful of the fact 
that “[a] patent, in the last analysis, simply represents a legal 
conclusion reached by the Patent Office.”  Lear, Inc. v. 
Adkins, 395 U.S. 653, 670 (1969).  Many patents issued by 
the PTO are later found to be invalid or not infringed, and a 
2002 study conducted by the FTC concluded that, in Hatch-
Waxman challenges made under paragraph IV, the generic 
challenger prevailed seventy-three percent of the time.  See 
FTC, Generic Drug Entry Prior to Patent Expiration 16 
(2002), available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/2002/07/ 
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genericdrugstudy.pdf; Kimberly A. Moore, Judges, Juries, 
and Patent Cases – An Empirical Peek Inside the Black Box, 
99 Mich. L. Rev. 365, 385 (2000) (noting that between 1983 
and 1999 the alleged infringer prevailed in forty-two percent 
of patent cases that reached trial).11
 
  These figures add force 
to the likelihood – conceded by the Tamoxifen majority – that 
reverse payments enable the holder of a patent that the holder 
knows is weak to buy its way out of both competition with 
the challenging competitor and possible invalidation of the 
patent.  466 F.3d at 211 (“The less sound the patent or the less 
clear the infringement, and therefore the less justified the 
monopoly enjoyed by the patent holder, the more a rule 
permitting settlement is likely to benefit the patent holder by 
allowing it to retain the patent.”).   
Moreover, we question the assumption underlying the 
view of the Second Circuit and other courts that subsequent 
challenges by other generic manufacturers will suffice to 
eliminate weak patents preserved through a reverse payment 
to the initial challenger.  Cf., e.g., id. at 211-12.  We note that 
the initial generic challenger is necessarily the most 
motivated because, unlike all subsequent challengers, it 
stands to benefit from the 180-day exclusivity period of 21 
U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(B)(iv).  Additionally, as the experience of 
at least one court in this Circuit confirms, the high profit 
margins of a monopolist drug manufacturer may enable it to 
pay off a whole series of challengers rather than suffer the 
                                              
11 The Pharmaceutical Research and Manufacturers of 
America points to a more recent study concluding that, in the 
years from 2000 to 2009, generics prevailed in slightly less 
than half of their challenges.  RBC Capital Mkts., 
Pharmaceuticals: Analyzing Litigation Success Rates 4 
(2010), available at http://www. amlawdaily.typepad. 
com/pharmareport.pdf.  Even if the industry’s own figures are 
accepted, they show that a substantial fraction of Hatch-
Waxman patent challenges succeed on the merits.  Moreover, 
the study cited by the industry further states that “when you 
take into account patent settlements and cases that were 
dropped, the success rate for generics jumps to 76%, 
substantially in favor of challenging patents.”  Id. 
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possible loss of its patent through litigation.  See King Drug 
Co. of Florence, Inc., 702 F. Supp. 2d at 521-22 (drug 
manufacturer settled infringement suits by four generic firms, 
which agreed to delay market entry “in exchange for 
significant payments . . . for various licensing agreements, 
supply agreements and research and development deals”). 
 
This practical analysis is supported by a long line of 
Supreme Court cases recognizing that valid patents are a 
limited exception to a general rule of the free exploitation of 
ideas.  It follows that the public interest supports judicial 
testing and elimination of weak patents.  See Cardinal Chem. 
Co. v. Morton Int’l, Inc., 508 U.S. 83, 100-01 (1993) 
(explaining the “importance to the public at large of resolving 
questions of patent validity” and noting the danger of 
“grant[ing] monopoly privileges to the holders of invalid 
patents”); Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thundercraft Boats, Inc., 489 
U.S. 141, 146 (1989) (noting that the patent laws embody “a 
careful balance between the need to promote innovation and 
the recognition that imitation and refinement through 
imitation are both necessary to invention itself and the very 
lifeblood of a competitive economy”); United States v. 
Masonite Corp., 316 U.S. 265, 277 (1942) (a patent “affords 
no immunity for a monopoly not fairly or plainly within the 
grant”); id. at 280 (patents are to be “strictly construed” 
because they are “privileges restrictive of a free economy”); 
Pope Mfg. Co. v. Gormully, 144 U.S. 224, 234 (1892) (“It is 
as important to the public that competition should not be 
repressed by worthless patents, as that the patentee of a really 
valuable invention should be protected in his monopoly.”). 
 
That reasoning underlies the decision of the Supreme 
Court in Edward Katzinger Co. v Chicago Metallic 
Manufacturing Co., where the Court considered whether a 
patent licensor could be contractually estopped from 
challenging the validity of the patent under a licensing 
agreement that also contained a price fixing term.  329 U.S. 
394 (1947).  The Court reasoned that if the patent was invalid, 
the price fixing provision would violate federal antitrust law 
and that, as such, the licensor could not be estopped from 
challenging the patent.  Id. at 399, 401-02.  In reaching this 
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conclusion the Court emphasized “the broad public interest in 
freeing our competitive economy from the trade restraints 
which might be imposed by price-fixing agreements 
stemming from narrow or invalid patents.”  Id. at 400 (citing 
Sola Elec. Co. v. Jefferson Elec. Co., 317 U.S. 173, 177 
(1942)).  The Court additionally stated: “It is the public 
interest which is dominant in the patent system and . . . the 
right to challenge [a patent] is not only a private right to the 
individual, but it is founded on public policy which is 
promoted by his making the defence, and contravened by his 
refusal to make it.”  Id. at 401 (internal citations and 
quotation marks omitted).   
 
This logic is persuasive with respect to the situation at 
bar because reverse payments permit the sharing of monopoly 
rents between would-be competitors without any assurance 
that the underlying patent is valid.  See also United States v. 
Studiengesellschaft Kohle, m.b.H., 670 F.2d 1122, 1136 (D.C. 
Cir. 1981) (suggesting an agreement might be anticompetitive 
if it “give[s] potential competitors incentives to remain in 
cartels rather than turning to another product, inventing 
around the patent, or challenging its validity”).  It appears that 
these aspects of the Supreme Court’s general patent 
jurisprudence had been overlooked by the Special Master and 
others adopting the scope of the patent test.   
 
We caution that our decision today is limited to reverse 
payments between patent holders and would be generic 
competitors in the pharmaceutical industry.  As the Supreme 
Court has made clear, “antitrust analysis must sensitively 
recognize and reflect the distinctive economic and legal 
setting of the regulated industry to which it applies.”  Verizon 
Commc’ns. Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP, 540 
U.S. 398, 411-12 (2004); see also IA Phillip E. Areeda & 
Herbert Hovenkamp Antitrust Law,  ¶ 240d, 289 (3d ed. 
2006) (“[T]he presence of regulation in some instances limits 
the antitrust role and in some instances simply changes it or 
even enlarges it.”).  The Supreme Court’s admonition is 
particularly relevant in an industry, like the pharmaceutical 
industry, that is subject to extensive regulation in which 
Congress has balanced the protection of intellectual property 
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and the need for competition.  Specifically, in passing the 
Hatch-Waxman Act, Congress drew a careful line between 
patent protection and the need to provide incentives for 
competition in the pharmaceutical industry.  See 130 Cong. 
Rec. 24425 (Sept. 6, 1984) (statement of Rep. Waxman 
underscoring the “fundamental balance of the bill”); H.R. 
Rep. No. 98-857, pt. 2, at 30 (1984) (emphasizing that the bill 
achieves “what the Congress has traditionally done in the area 
of intellectual property law[:] balance the need to stimulate 
innovation against the goal of furthering the public interest”), 
reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2686, 2715.  The line that 
Congress drew between these competing objectives strongly 
supports the application of rule of reason scrutiny of reverse 
payment settlements in the pharmaceutical industry.   
 
The goal of the Hatch-Waxman Act is to increase the 
availability of low cost generic drugs.  H.R. Rep. No. 98-857, 
pt. 1, at 14, reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2647, 2647.  One 
method Congress employed was to encourage litigated 
challenges by generic manufacturers against the holders of 
weak or narrow patents.  See 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(B)(iv) 
(establishing 180-day exclusivity period as reward for 
successfully challenging a patent); S. Rep. No. 107-167, at 4 
(2002) (“Under Hatch-Waxman, manufacturers of generic 
drugs are encouraged to challenge weak or invalid patents on 
brand name drugs so consumers can enjoy lower drug 
prices.”).  That goal is undermined by application of the 
scope of the patent test which entitles the patent holder to pay 
its potential generic competitors not to compete.  As one 
commentator has noted, this approach nominally protects 
intellectual property, not on the strength of a patent holder’s 
legal rights, but on the strength of its wallet.  See Hemphill, 
Paying for Delay, supra at 1614 (“In the Hatch-Waxman Act 
. . . the promotion and delay of litigation are central 
preoccupations of the regulatory regime.  An open-ended 
permission for innovators to set innovation policy by self-
help [through reverse payments] is less plausible, as Congress 
has taken explicit steps to fill those gaps.”)  As the Second 
Circuit acknowledged in its Tamoxifen decision, the principal 
beneficiaries of such an approach will be name brand 
manufacturers with weak or narrow patents that are unlikely 
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to prevail in court.  See 466 F.3d at 211.  Thus while such a 
rule might be good policy from the perspective of name brand 
and generic pharmaceutical producers, it is bad policy from 
the perspective of the consumer, precisely the constituency 
Congress was seeking to protect. 
 
In rejecting the scope of the patent test, we are 
cognizant that such a test encourages settlement, an objective 
our decisions generally support.  See, e.g., Ehrheart v. 
Verizon Wireless, 609 F.3d 590, 595 (3d Cir. 2010) 
(“Settlement agreements are to be encouraged because they 
promote the amicable resolution of disputes and lighten the 
increasing load of litigation faced by the federal courts.”).  
However, the judicial preference for settlement, while 
generally laudable, should not displace countervailing public 
policy objectives or, in this case, Congress’s determination – 
which is evident from the structure of the Hatch-Waxman Act 
and the statements in the legislative record – that litigated 
patent challenges are necessary to protect consumers from 
unjustified monopolies by name brand drug manufacturers.  
We also emphasize that nothing in the rule of reason test that 
we adopt here limits the ability of the parties to reach 
settlements based on a negotiated entry date for marketing of 
the generic drug: the only settlements subject to antitrust 
scrutiny are those involving a reverse payment from the name 
brand manufacturer to the generic challenger.  Data analyzed 
by the FTC suggest that this will leave the vast majority of 
pharmaceutical patent settlements unaffected.  See FTC, 
Bureau of Competition, Agreements Filed with the Federal 
Trade Commission under the Medicare Prescription Drug, 
Improvement, and Modernization Act of 2003: Overview of 
Agreements Filed in FY 2010, 2 (2011) (showing that nearly 
seventy-five percent of Hatch-Waxman Act infringement 
suits that settled in 2010 did so without reverse payments), 
available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/2011/05/1105 
mmagreements.pdf.  
 
For all of these reasons we reject the scope of the 
patent test.  In its place we will direct the District Court to 
apply a quick look rule of reason analysis based on the 
economic realities of the reverse payment settlement rather 
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than the labels applied by the settling parties.  Specifically, 
the finder of fact must treat any payment from a patent holder 
to a generic patent challenger who agrees to delay entry into 
the market as prima facie evidence of an unreasonable 
restraint of trade, which could be rebutted by showing that the 
payment (1) was for a purpose other than delayed entry or (2) 
offers some pro-competitive benefit.   
 
In holding that a reverse payment is prima facie 
evidence of an unreasonable restraint of trade, we follow the 
approach suggested by the DC Circuit in Andrx and embrace 
that court’s common sense conclusion that “[a] payment 
flowing from the innovator to the challenging generic firm 
may suggest strongly the anticompetitive intent of the parties 
entering the agreement . . . .”  256 F.3d at 809 (internal 
quotation marks and citation omitted).   
 
We agree, moreover, with the FTC that there is no 
need to consider the merits of the underlying patent suit 
because “[a]bsent proof of other offsetting consideration, it is 
logical to conclude that the quid pro quo for the payment was 
an agreement by the generic to defer entry beyond the date 
that represents an otherwise reasonable litigation 
compromise.”  In re Schering-Plough Corp., Final Order, 136 
F.T.C. at 988.  Of course, a patent holder may attempt to 
rebut plaintiff’s prima facie case of an unreasonable restraint 
of trade by arguing that there is in fact no reverse payment 
because any money that changed hands was for something 
other than a delay in market entry.  Alternatively, the patent 
holder may attempt to rebut the prima facie case by 
demonstrating that the reverse payment offers a competitive 
benefit that could not have been achieved in the absence of a 
reverse payment.  This second possible defense attempts to 
account for the – probably rare – situations where a reverse 
payment increases competition.  For example, a modest cash 
payment that enables a cash-starved generic manufacturer to 
avoid bankruptcy and begin marketing a generic drug might 
have an overall effect of increasing the amount of competition 
in the market.  For the reasons set forth, we will reverse the 
judgment of the District Court and remand for further 
proceedings in accordance with the foregoing. 
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IV. THE CLASS CERTIFICATION ISSUE             
(Appeal No. 10-4571) 
 
A. Procedural Background 
 
The other issue before us on this appeal concerns 
plaintiffs’ effort to certify a class of persons who purchased 
K-Dur directly from Schering between November 20, 1998 
and September 1, 2001 and subsequently purchased a generic 
version of K-Dur.  As identified by the parties’ experts, the 
class consists of forty-four wholesalers and retailers.  The 
Special Master recommended granting plaintiffs’ motion to 
certify the class.  The District Court adopted the Special 
Master’s Report and Recommendation and formally certified 
the class.  
   
Defendants sought interlocutory review of the District 
Court’s order under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(f).  
While that petition was pending, the District Court ruled on 
the cross motions for summary judgment and entered final 
judgment in defendants’ favor.  Plaintiffs filed a notice of 
appeal, and defendants filed a cross appeal, which this court 
dismissed as untimely.  See Order, In re K-Dur Antitrust 
Litig., No. 10-2727 (3d Cir. Nov. 24, 2010).  However, this 
court accepted defendants’ Rule 23(f) petition, see Order, In 
re K-Dur Antitrust Litig., No. 09-8006 (3d Cir. Nov. 16, 
2010), and we therefore have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 
U.S.C. § 1292(e).12
 
 
                                              
12 Plaintiffs argue that because defendants’ cross appeal 
was dismissed as untimely defendants’ 23(f) petition should 
have been dismissed also.  An appeals court has discretion to 
consider an interlocutory appeal even after the entry of final 
judgment.  Cf. In re Coordinated Pretrial Proceedings in 
Petroleum Prods. Antitrust Litig., 788 F.2d 1571, 1573-74 
(Temp. Emer. Ct. App. 1986).  Moreover, in granting 
defendants’ 23(f) petition, this court has already considered 
the issue of the appropriateness of review, and we see no 
reason to reconsider the decision to hear this appeal. 
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B. Standard of Review 
 
 This court reviews class certification orders “for abuse 
of discretion, which occurs if the district court’s decision rests 
upon a clearly erroneous finding of fact, an errant conclusion 
of law or an improper application of law to fact.”  In re 
Hydrogen Peroxide Antitrust Litig., 552 F.3d 305, 312 (3d 
Cir. 2008) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). 
 
C. Defendants’ Arguments 
 
In order to certify a class under Rule 23(b)(3), a 
plaintiff must satisfy both the general class action 
prerequisites – numerosity, commonality, typicality, and 
adequacy of representation – and the additional requirements 
of predominance and superiority.  Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a), 
(b)(3).  The Special Master, in a report adopted in full by the 
District Court, discussed the class requirements in detail; 
defendants challenge only a few of those findings.  
Defendants assert that (1) plaintiffs cannot use common 
evidence to prove that the class members suffered an actual 
injury from defendants’ conduct because showing actual 
injury means demonstrating lost profits damages, which 
defendants argue necessarily requires individualized 
assessments, (2) even assuming that overcharges are an 
acceptable form of injury, the District Court erred in its 
conclusion that there was common evidence of injury to all 
class members, and (3) the class should not have been 
certified because of inherent conflicts between members.  
Defendants’ first two arguments challenge the District 
Court’s finding with respect to the predominance 
requirement, while the third goes to the adequacy 
requirement.  We address these arguments in order.   
 
1. 
 
Predominance Issues 
In order for the predominance requirement to be 
satisfied “[i]ssues common to the class must predominate 
over individual issues.”  In re Hydrogen Peroxide, 552 F.3d 
at 311 (internal citations and quotation marks omitted).  Class 
certification calls for the district court to conduct a “rigorous 
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assessment of the available evidence,” id. at 312, and is only 
appropriate in antitrust cases where plaintiffs can show, by a 
preponderance of the evidence, that proof of the essential 
elements of the cause of action, including antitrust injury, do 
not require individual treatment.  Id. at 307, 311.   
 
It is plaintiffs’ thesis that they will prove that class 
members paid more for K-Dur because of Schering’s antitrust 
violations, and that this constitutes the required antitrust 
impact.  The Special Master accepted this based on Third 
Circuit law, stating:  
 
The Third Circuit has held that “when an 
antitrust violation impacts upon a class of 
persons who do have standing, there is no 
reason in doctrine why proof of impact cannot 
be made on a common basis, so long as the 
common proof adequately demonstrates some 
damage to each individual.”   
 
App. at 7980 (quoting Bogosian v. Gulf Oil Corp., 561 F.2d 
434, 454 (3d Cir. 1977)).    Because all of the class members 
purchased some of the generic versions of K-Dur, plaintiffs 
have satisfactorily explained their theory of impact.  
 
Plaintiffs proposed to prove antitrust injury through 
common proof consisting largely of the declarations and 
report of their expert, Dr. Leitzinger.  Dr. Leitzinger offered 
statistical and economic analyses of the overall brand-name 
and generic drug market and of the specific entry of generic 
potassium chloride in the market to show that, but for the 
challenged reverse payment agreements, “all (or virtually all) 
members of the proposed class” would have purchased at 
least some less expensive generic potassium chloride earlier, 
and therefore suffered an antitrust injury as a result of the 
delay in generic entry.  The Special Master considered Dr. 
Leitzinger’s proposed methodology and the criticisms of it 
made by defendants’ expert, Dr. Rubinfeld, in detail.  After 
slightly narrowing the class definition to accommodate a 
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criticism made by defendants’ expert,13
 
 the Special Master 
found that plaintiffs had satisfied their burden of showing that 
antitrust impact may be proven by evidence common to all 
class members.   
In December 2008, several months after the Special 
Master’s Report and Recommendation, this court issued its 
decision in In re Hydrogen Peroxide Antitrust Litigation, 
which clarified the standard to be applied when certifying a 
class of plaintiffs in an antitrust action.  552 F.3d 305.  In that 
case, we held that the preponderance requirement demands 
more than a mere threshold showing by a party seeking to 
certify a class and that, in considering a motion for class 
certification, a district court is required to resolve any factual 
or legal disputes necessary to determine whether a plaintiff 
will be able to show antitrust injury for all plaintiffs with 
common evidence.  Id. at 316-18. 
 
a. Whether Lost Profits Are the Relevant Antitrust 
Injury 
 
Defendants argue first that the predominance 
requirement of Rule 23(b)(3) is not satisfied because, in order 
to prove actual injury from delayed generic entry, plaintiffs 
must produce evidence of lost profits, which necessarily 
requires an individual assessment for each class member.  
Defendants contend specifically that some of the wholesalers 
lost substantial sales volumes after generic entry, and that, for 
such wholesalers, generic entry caused a decrease in profits.   
 
Defendants’ lost profits argument is unavailing 
because it is simply a version of the so-called “passing-on 
defense” that was rejected by the Supreme Court in Hanover 
Shoe, Inc. v. United Shoe Machinery Corporation.  392 U.S. 
481 (1968).  In that case, the Supreme Court held that 
demonstrating antitrust injury does not require a showing of 
                                              
 
13 Specifically, the Special Master excluded from the class 
direct purchasers who did not purchase a generic version of 
K-Dur after generic entry.   
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lost profits.  Id. at 494.  Rather, the Supreme Court ruled that 
a plaintiff suffers an antitrust injury where it is overcharged 
for a product, regardless of whether it can show lost profits.  
Id. at 492-95.  In reaching this conclusion, the Court noted 
that requiring plaintiffs to show lost profits was too 
burdensome on both courts and litigants and would undercut 
the effectiveness of private antitrust suits as an enforcement 
mechanism.  Id. at 492-94; see also Bogosian, 561 F.2d at 
456 (noting that a lost-profits inquiry would be “enormously 
complicated, posing a tremendous burden on the presentation 
of plaintiffs’ case” and that “it is precisely for this reason that 
the Supreme Court eliminated the ‘passing-on defense’ in 
Hanover Shoe”).   
 
Defendants argue that the Hanover Shoe rule should 
not apply here because that case involved an overcharge for 
an identical product whereas this one involves two different 
products, a name brand drug with a higher price and a lower 
priced generic drug.  However, defendants cite no authority 
distinguishing Hanover Shoe on that basis, and their own 
expert conceded that the generic supplement that Schering 
began manufacturing after Upsher entered the market was 
made in the same plant as K-Dur and chemically identical to 
K-Dur.  Moreover, in In re Warfarin Sodium Antitrust 
Litigation, this court affirmed class certification where 
plaintiffs sought overcharges – not lost profits – stemming 
from anti-competitive behavior that hindered their access to 
generic pharmaceuticals.  391 F.3d 516, 532 (3d Cir. 2004). 
 
In sum, defendants’ contention that plaintiffs are 
required to show lost profits in order to demonstrate antitrust 
injury is without support in law or the facts of this case.  As 
such, we reject it.  
 
b. Whether There Was Common Evidence of Injury to 
All Class Members 
 
Defendants argue that because of discrepancies in the 
pricing of K-Dur and variations in purchaser behavior, 
plaintiffs cannot prove injury to all class members by 
common evidence, even if lost profits are not required to 
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show antitrust injury.  They contend further that the District 
Court applied the wrong standard in evaluating plaintiffs’ 
evidence that antitrust injury could be proven by common 
evidence.  
  
In support of their argument that antitrust injury 
requires an individualized assessment for each class member, 
defendants point to two places where purportedly conflicting 
evidence demonstrates the need for individualized assessment 
of antitrust harm.  Defendants point out that they did not sell 
K-Dur to all customers at a single list price; rather, the price 
paid varied considerably among class members.  
Additionally, defendants argue that, for certain customers at 
certain times, Schering offered rebates which caused further 
price variation among customers.  Defendants contend that 
these pricing variations caused several class members to have 
zero or negative damages under the formula applied by 
plaintiffs’ expert.  Finally, defendants point out that not all 
class members purchased generic potassium chloride as soon 
as it became available and argue that, in light of this variation 
in purchase timing, plaintiffs need to make an individualized 
showing that each plaintiff would have purchased a generic 
product earlier if one had been available.     
 
We do not read Hydrogen Peroxide as precluding a 
class because of variations in purchasing by a very small 
percentage of those who purchased K-Dur.  As the Special 
Master recognized, defendants conceded “that 45 of the 
proposed Class members purchased some
 
 amount of generic 
K-Dur.”  App. at 7984 (emphasis in original).  He noted that 
defendants’ arguments “relate to the quantum of damages, 
rather than the fact of injury.”  Id.  Indeed, in Hydrogen 
Peroxide itself, we focused on what was really at issue – that 
for certification plaintiff need not prove antitrust injury 
actually occurred. 
Plaintiffs’ burden at the class certification stage 
is not to prove the element of antitrust impact, 
although in order to prevail on the merits each 
class member must do so.  Instead, the task for 
plaintiffs at class certification is to demonstrate 
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that the element of antitrust impact is capable of 
proof at trial through evidence that is common 
to the class rather than individual to its 
members. 
 
552 F.3d at 311-12.  To the extent that there were minor 
variations, they can be handled at trial in the context of 
damages.  
 
With regard to both the price-variation and purchase-
timing issues, the Special Master conducted an exceedingly 
thorough review of plaintiffs’ proposal for demonstrating 
antitrust impact through common evidence and determined 
that defendants’ objections were without support.  Critically, 
the Special Master recognized his obligation to “probe 
beyond the pleadings” and to conduct a “rigorous analysis” of 
the available evidence.  App. at 7960 (internal citations and 
quotation marks omitted).   
 
Our review confirms that the Special Master applied 
the appropriate standard.  In contrast to Hydrogen Peroxide, 
where the court found that there was “no tendency for prices . 
. . to move together,” 552 F.3d at 314 (internal quotation 
marks omitted), plaintiffs in this case presented evidence, 
credited by the Special Master, of significant, industry-wide 
price drops after generic entry.  Such evidence of an industry-
wide price drop after generic entry supports the Special 
Master’s rejection of defendants’ arguments about limited 
price variations and purchase-timing variations between 
plaintiffs. 
 
First, concerning the price-variation argument, the 
Special Master carefully considered the conflicting opinions 
of plaintiffs’ and defendants’ experts and credited the theories 
of plaintiffs’ expert over that of defendants.  The Special 
Master concluded that “Plaintiffs have satisfied their burden 
of adducing sufficient evidence and a plausible theory to 
convince me that impact may be proven by evidence common 
to all class members.”  App. at 7988 (internal citations and 
quotation marks omitted).  Our review of the record confirms 
that plaintiffs presented a comprehensive and detailed means 
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of proving impact through common means, notwithstanding 
some very limited pricing variation, and that the Special 
Master conducted an appropriately searching evaluation of 
this evidence. 
 
With regard to defendants’ argument about variations 
in the timing of the purchase of generic K-Dur, the Special 
Master explicitly rejected that argument and concluded that 
“[e]vidence that all (or virtually all) class members 
substituted a lower priced generic for some of their K-Dur 20 
purchases gives rise to the inference that they would have 
similarly done in the but-for world.”  App. at 7984.  This, 
combined with plaintiffs’ theory of damages, means that 
impact could be proven on a class-wide basis via common 
evidence.  Here again, the Special Master conducted a 
thorough evaluation of the available evidence and resolved all 
significant disputes between conflicting evidence as required 
under the standard set forth in Hydrogen Peroxide. 
 
2. 
 
Adequacy Issue – Whether the Class 
Faces Inherent Conflicts 
Defendants next contend that the District Court erred 
in certifying a class because the class faces inherent conflicts 
that preclude adequacy of representation.  “The inquiry that a 
court should make regarding the adequacy of representation 
requisite of Rule 23(a)(4) is to determine that the putative 
named plaintiff has the ability and the incentive to represent 
the claims of the class vigorously, . . . and that there is no 
conflict between the individual’s claims and those asserted on 
behalf of the class.”  In re Cmty. Bank of N. Va., 622 F.3d 
275, 291 (3d Cir. 2010) (quoting Hassine v. Jeffes, 846 F.2d 
169, 179 (3d Cir. 1988)).  Only a fundamental conflict will 
defeat adequacy of representation.  See, e.g., id. at 303 
(adequacy defeated by “obvious and fundamental intra-class 
conflict of interest”); Ward v. Dixie Nat. Life Ins. Co., 595 
F.3d 164, 180 (4th Cir. 2010). 
 
Defendants contend that three members of the class, all 
national wholesalers, were net beneficiaries of the absence of 
generic competition in the potassium chloride supplement 
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market because once generics came on the market those class 
members saw decreased sales volumes and lower per-pill 
profits.  Defendants argue that, because these three class 
members have financial incentives to delay generic entry, 
there is an inherent conflict between them and the rest of the 
class.   
 
The case law on defendants’ argument reveals a split 
in authority.  A large number of district courts, including 
some in this Circuit, have rejected defendants’ argument.  
See, e.g., Teva Pharms USA, Inc. v. Abbott Labs., 252 F.R.D. 
213, 226-27 (D. Del. 2008) (Robinson, J.); Meijer, Inc. v. 
Abbott Labs., 251 F.R.D. 431, 435 (N.D. Cal. 2008); but see 
Valley Drug Co. v. Geneva Pharms., Inc., 350 F.3d 1181, 
1190 (11th Cir. 2003).14
 
   
We reject the Valley Drug decision for two reasons.  
First, requiring plaintiffs to show that no class member 
benefitted from the challenged conduct in the form of greater 
profits is contrary to the Supreme Court’s decision in 
Hanover Shoe.  In Hanover Shoe, the Supreme Court 
permitted antitrust plaintiffs to seek overcharge damages 
rather than lost profits damages precisely because proving 
lost profits was too complicated and burdensome.  392 U.S. at 
493; Bogosian, 561 F.2d at 456.  The same logic applies 
equally, if not more strongly, in the class certification setting 
because under defendants’ proposed approach, plaintiffs 
would not only have to assess their own lost profits but also 
those of potential class members.  Moreover, because 
Hanover Shoe sets the amount of the overcharge as plaintiffs’ 
damages, all of the class members have the same financial 
incentive for purposes of the litigation – i.e. proving that they 
were overcharged and recovering damages based on that 
overcharge.  See 7A Charles Alan Wright, Arthur R. Miller & 
Mary Kay Kane, Federal Practice and Procedure § 1768 (3d 
ed. 2005) (“[A] potential conflict between the representatives 
and some class members should not preclude the use of the 
class-action device if the parties appear united in interest 
                                              
14 This is a different appeal than Valley Drug, 344 F.3d 
1294 (11th Cir. 2003), discussed supra.   
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against an outsider at the beginning of the case.”).  
Defendants have not pointed to any plausible scenario in 
which the class members might seek conflicting forms of 
relief.  For these reasons, we conclude that defendants’ 
conflict argument fails.   
 
D. Conclusion – Class Certification Issues 
 
In sum, with respect to the class certification issues, 
we reject defendants’ arguments and will affirm the District 
Court’s determination approving maintenance of the class 
action. 
 
 
 
